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CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
When I decided to delve into the referendum, I listened to the various positions and found myself more confused than before. I therefore decided to try to go and read the modifications proposals and to compare them with the current text of the Constitution to understand what would have changed. To my great surprise, the text was simple and understandable: it is therefore evident what the proposed changes are on which we are called to vote.
The substantial changes, besides the separation of careers, are two.
Article 3, amendments to Article 104proposes that the 10 lay members of the Superior Council of the Magistracy be drawn by lot from a list compiled by Parliament. Currently, the 10 lay members are directly elected from parliament. What changes then: instead of electing the 10 members, Parliament would select a ‘wide range of qualified individuals from whom the 10 members would then be drawn by lot. Parliament would select the possible candidates from whom the lottery would be drawn, consisting of full university professors in legal subjects and lawyers with at least fifteen years of practice (as also happens now).
Article 4, amendments to Article 105Currently, the Supreme Judicial Council makes decisions on hiring, assignments, transfers, promotions, and disciplinary actions for magistrates. With the modification, there would be two Supreme Judicial Councils, one for each career path (judicial and prosecutorial), and they would handle the same matters they do today, except for disciplinary actions.
In this in-depth look, you can see the current article and the new version of it. In the “new” version, words that differ from the current version are in bold. This makes the changes obvious.
The veracity of the document can be easily checked through the links to modifications proposals and to the Constitution current.
A constitutional referendum is an important event, and the entire population is called upon to express its opinion on changes to the Italian Constitution. Therefore, it is everyone's duty to be objectively informed in order to vote with awareness.
I hope this information can be useful for everyone to make a conscious decision according to one's own conscience and not because X or Y said so.
Unfortunately, many people (my cousin included...) are treating this referendum as a political vote. It is not: it is a constitutional amendment that deserves our attention because it concerns everyone. The current government has said very clearly that it would not resign even if the "no" vote won. Why is someone taking it as a political vote? In 2016, on the occasion of another constitutional referendum, Renzi said that if the "no" vote won, he would resign. Mistake: he turned a referendum into a political vote. This is not the case now. Even if the "no" vote wins, the government will remain where it is.
The articles for which a modification is requested are listed below: most of them are text edits, from one higher council to two.
For each article of the constitution, the current version and the proposed version in the amendment are reported.in italics
ATTENTION: the message on our packages, “be aware, be conscious, live better,” is not a marketing slogan but the reason, the essence, of Live Better's very existence: to bring CONSCIOUSNESS. Therefore, this in-depth explanation is absolutely consistent. It simply presents the facts, what we are called to vote on: the amendment of certain articles of the Constitution.
ARTICLE 1 amendments to the’ Article 87
Current: Presides over the Superior Council of the Judiciary
New: Presides over the High Judicial Council the judge and the requesting Superior Council of the Judiciary
ARTICLE 2 amendments to the’ Article 102
Current: The judicial function is exercised by ordinary magistrates established and regulated by the rules on the judicial system.
New: The judicial function is exercised by ordinary magistrates established and regulated by the rules on the judicial system, which also govern the distinct careers of judging and prosecuting magistrates.
ARTICLE 3 amendments to’ Article 104
Comma 1
Current: The judiciary constitutes an autonomous order independent of all other powers.
New: The judiciary constitutes a separate and independent order, distinct from all other powers. and it is composed of magistrates from the judicial and public prosecution careers.
Comma 2
Current: The Higher Council of the Judiciary is presided over by the President of the Republic.
New The Superior Council of the Judiciary for judging and the Superior Council of the Judiciary for prosecution are presided over by the President of the Republic.
Comma 3
They include by right the first president and the prosecutor general of the Court of Cassation.
New: They are part of it by right, respectively, the first president and the prosecutor general of the Court of Cassation.
Comma 4
Current: The other members are elected by two-thirds by all ordinary magistrates from among members of the various categories, and by one-third by Parliament in joint session from among ordinary university professors in legal matters and lawyers after fifteen years of practice.
New: The other components are drawn, for a third, give me a list of full university professors in legal subjects and lawyers with at least fifteen years of practice, that the Parliament in joint session, within six months of its inauguration, Compile by election, e, for two-thirds, respectively, between the judging magistrates and the prosecuting magistrates, in the number and according to the procedures provided for by law.
Comma 5
Current: The Council shall elect a Vice-President from among the Members designated by Parliament.
New Each The council elects its vice-chair from among the designated members by lottery from the list compiled by the Parliament in joint session.
Comma 6
Current: Elected members of the Council serve for four years and are not immediately re-eligible for election.
New The components designated by drawing they serve four-year terms and they cannot participate in the subsequent drawing procedure.
Comma 7
Current: While in office, they may not be registered in professional registers, nor may they be members of Parliament or a Regional Council.
New The components While in office, they cannot be registered in professional registers, nor can they be members of Parliament or a regional council.
ARTICLE 4: amendments to’ Article 105
Current: The Superior Council of the Judiciary, according to the rules of the judicial system, is responsible for the hiring, assignments and transfers, promotions, and disciplinary measures concerning judges.
New: They are entitled each Superior Council of the Judiciary, according to the rules on the judicial system, regarding the hiring, assignments, transfers, professional assessments, and conferral of functions of judges.
The disciplinary jurisdiction over ordinary magistrates, both judging and prosecuting, is attributed to the High Disciplinary Court.
The High Court is composed of fifteen judges, three of whom are appointed by the President of the Republic from among full university professors in legal matters and lawyers with at least twenty years of practice, and three drawn by lot from a list of individuals possessing the same qualifications, which is compiled by Parliament in a joint session within six months of its establishment through election. It also includes six judging magistrates and three prosecuting magistrates, drawn by lot from their respective categories with at least twenty years of judicial experience and who are currently serving or have served in appellate functions.
The High Court elects the president from among judges appointed by the President of the Republic or drawn by lot from the list compiled by Parliament in joint session.
The High Court judges serve for four years.
The assignment cannot be renewed.
The office of High Court judge is incompatible with those of Member of Parliament, Member of the European Parliament, member of a Regional Council and of the Government, with the practice of law, and with any other office and position indicated by law.
Appeals against judgments issued by the High Court in the first instance are admissible, including on grounds of merit, solely before the same High Court, which shall rule without the participation of the members who contributed to rendering the contested decision.
The law determines disciplinary offenses and their related sanctions, indicates the composition of the councils, establishes the forms of disciplinary proceedings and the necessary rules for the functioning of the High Court, and ensures that judging or prosecuting magistrates are represented on the council.
ARTICLE 5: amendments to the’Article 106
Current: Upon designation by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, full professors of law at universities and lawyers who have fifteen years of practice and are registered in the special rolls for the higher jurisdictions may be appointed to the office of cassation counselors, for distinguished merit.
New: On the designation of the Superior Council of the Judiciary judging Professors of law at universities may be appointed to the office of ordinary judges of the Court of Cassation for distinguished merit, magistrates belonging to the prosecuting magistracy with at least fifteen years of service in their functions and lawyers who have fifteen years of practice and are registered in the special rolls for superior jurisdictions.
ARTICLE 6: amendments to the’Article 107
Current: Magistrates are irremovable. They cannot be dismissed or suspended from service, nor transferred to other locations or roles, except by decision of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, adopted either for the reasons and with the defense guarantees established by the judicial system or with their consent.
New: Magistrates are irremovable. They cannot be dismissed or suspended from service, nor transferred to other locations or roles, except by decision of the respective Superior Council of the Judiciary, adopted either for the reasons and with the defense guarantees established by the judicial system or with their consent.
ARTICLE 7: amendments to’Article 110
Current: With the powers of the Superior Council of the Judiciary suspended, the organization and functioning of justice-related services fall to the Minister of Justice.
New: Dairy skills each Supreme Judicial Council, the organization and functioning of justice services fall under the Minister of Justice.
ARTICLE 8: transitional provisions
1. Laws on the Superior Council of the Judiciary, judicial organization, and disciplinary jurisdiction shall be brought into conformity with the provisions of this constitutional law within one year of its entry into force.
2. Until the date of entry into force of the laws referred to in paragraph 1, the rules in force on the date of entry into force of this constitutional law shall continue to be observed in the matters indicated therein.
Thank you
What do you vote for?
The vote is secret! And besides, I would NEVER want to influence anyone. Everyone must vote according to their own conscience.
Perfect explanation, knowledge is freedom.
Precise, as only you can be. 👍🏻
Thank you!
Thank you, a little more information is always useful!
Thank you!!!
Some points were not clear to me.
Now I have more confidence/awareness regarding the vote I will cast.
Thanks again!!!
Thank you Elena... a scientist in this case too!
As Gen Z would say, Elena, you're a topperia... meaning you're the top ❤️
You've surprised me once again, in a positive way, of course. I respect you and thank you for sharing.
Thank you 💞 for this clarification. I'm having a little difficulty understanding... but I know what to do. Thanks again...
Congratulations, Elena, it's not for everyone to take the time to understand things well. Truly, congratulations, I admire you as a person. I like you, sooner or later we'll meet up at the Alpe di Siusi for a nice hike together. A hug.
I find this referendum a scandal; you can't ask the population to change the constitution.
This falls to the politicians, who must confront each other to find the right “compromises” to enact changes. In this case, there was no parliamentary confrontation between the parties. This is a scandal, and the responsibility lies with the majority.
For this reason, we must vote NO, hoping that the “gentlemen” who are overpaid will understand their mistakes.
Thank you, Elena! Living better means living consciously, and this deep dive proves it.
Thank you Elena, that's very helpful and objective.
Dear Elena, thanks again! Believe it or not, I was tempted to ask for your help with this, and you anticipated me. 🙏 Just a few days ago, I was talking to a friend about how confused I was about it, and that the only thing I understood was that politics has nothing to do with it here. I was even considering abstaining from voting, which isn't really my nature, but rather than voting without understanding and causing harm, I thought it was better not to! That being said, I'm being honest, I still don't fully understand, and I'm sure many others are in the same boat... 🥺😭
Elena, I'm in the same situation as you!
Thank you very much Elena, consistent as always, this time too you've put awareness at the center!
Thank you very much!!
Thanks! At least I had the chance to read everything
Thank you, I'll read it tomorrow just in time to decide whether to vote, otherwise I'd decided to skip it this time!
Let's hope we can figure something out.
Rodolfo Offidani
Thank you very much
You've certainly explained it better than many others. But in fact, it's a political choice. Because we've heard honorable members currently under investigation on television state that they hope for these constitutional changes so they won't have to undergo trials and can get away with it. Or others stating that it will be functional for those in power. And they all agree that these changes will not reduce trial times.
In light of this, I draw my own conclusions:
I don't feel like modifying our Constitution!
Thank you very much, even though it's a very technical topic that not all citizens can fully understand. The literal meaning of the text should still be contextualized to the reform and the context in which it is placed. The goal should be an improvement of the judicial system, and one should understand whether the separation of careers is the problem of a system that is not working as it should, or if the problems lie elsewhere.
Thanks Elena, you're always the best.
Thank you for sharing this personal research in an effort to understand how best to exercise our sacred right to vote.
I vote YES, BECAUSE THIS IS AN OUTDATED LAW. IN FACT, ALL THE DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD HAVE SEPARATION OF CAREERS. THE UNION OF CAREERS HAS REMAINED IN COUNTRIES WITH DICTATORSHIPS. ASK YOURSELF A QUESTION, MY DEAR ELENA. I AM AMAZED BY YOU, SO PRECISE IN DESCRIBING THE CONSTITUTION, AND YOU FORGET THAT THE CONSTITUTION HAS ALREADY BEEN CHANGED OVER THE YEARS BY YOUR COMMUNIST FRIENDS, BUT YOU DON'T TALK ABOUT IT. I VOTE YEEEEEEEEEEEEES BECAUSE IN THIS COUNTRY THE LAW NEVER MEETS JUSTICE, MY DEAR.
Hi Isabella,
In this document, I wanted to analyze the facts: what are the proposed changes. Do not give an opinion about it.
In my position, I don't think it's correct to express an opinion, as I might influence people based on like or dislike. Everyone should be free to vote according to their conscience.
The Constitution, as conceived by our founding fathers, was an enormous undertaking carried out over many decades by ALL the parties present on the political scene at the time. Even today, it protects and guarantees the rule of law, democracy, and the balance of powers within the State. In my opinion, any modifications to it would require the broadest consensus and not a referendum without a quorum! Not to mention the duplication of the CSM, which will lead to a doubling of public spending and a duality of opinions on common matters. In my view, it's useless....
The constitution is not sacred and inviolable.
The constitution should be remodeled and follow the evolution of the times, but I understand that the noun “evolution” is not shared, understood, and suitable for everyone.
That said, I find choosing to vote based on political alignment to be a short-sighted and reductionist attitude.
Propaganda has always been there and from both sides, just as we have always been equipped with brains and spirit and critical thinking.
I also understand that not everyone has the ability to exercise it.
I think the vision for this referendum is not an end in itself.
I share the thought of
Lara and MariaGrazia (March 20)
Also, I would add that the “way” they've jumped on this topic, I don't consider fair.
The separation of careers does not improve the justice process.
In fact, as of today, a magistrate can change roles (from judge to public prosecutor or vice versa) but only once during their career, within 9-10 years of their first appointment. The transition requires passing an eligibility assessment and changing districts/regions.
Considering that, as of today, fewer than 1% are making this switch—and, incidentally, some people argue that it might be a good idea to try both options…—it makes one suspect that this referendum serves some other purpose…
Thank you for sharing.
As I understand it, the separation of careers has nothing to do with changing careers, but rather with a concern about impartiality, given that prosecutors and judges are in the same institutional “house.” They know each other, perhaps they've worked together for 20 years, they go to lunch together, in a sense they are colleagues and it's human to have a more favorable inclination towards people we are closer to. That's why they want to separate careers: so that there is distance between the judge and the prosecutor, just as there is between the judge and the lawyer.
Thank you, as always clear and honest.
Thank you, it was helpful to me too.
Thank you, Elena, your work is extremely clear. However, in my opinion, the crucial point is not understood from a simple examination of the constitution and the proposed amendments. The point is whether the separation of careers is functional or not for the judicial system. And this is something that an ordinary citizen struggles to understand.
I take the liberty of intervening with great respect. I am a judge (and also a passionate fan of Elena's Ghi butter 😊) and I happened to read this email: first of all, sincere congratulations on your work and your commitment to trying to make a very technical topic understandable.
I hope I'm not being inappropriate. I don't want to convince anyone or influence anyone's vote: I'm just asking you to read my statement as that of a doctor who, when faced with something he believes is potentially harmful to health, struggles to remain silent.
I'll try to say only a few essential things.
First: this reform will not improve the justice service for citizens in any way. With the approximately 112 million euros it will cost, many concrete interventions could be made (personnel, facilities, offices, IT systems) that would truly impact the duration and quality of legal proceedings.
Second: the core of the reform is not really the separation of careers. In fact, after the Cartabia reform, careers are already separate: to move from prosecutor to judge (or vice versa) requires changing regions, it can be done only once in a lifetime, and only within the first 10 years. The numbers are negligible: about 0.4 transfers per year (there are WhatsApp chats with more people than that!). Would it really make sense to amend the Constitution for this?
If the separation of careers were truly the core of the reform, then it would be difficult to understand why, at the most delicate moment – the disciplinary one – judges and prosecutors are brought back together in the High Court. Here, the narrative simply doesn't hold up.
The separation of careers is therefore, in my opinion, a smokescreen: a very sensitive topic, used as a facade to push through much more significant changes.
It is planned to create two CSMs, with different composition systems and a greater policy weight. But here too, a question naturally arises: since functional changes are numerically irrelevant, why create two CSMs instead of one with double the costs? “Divide and conquer,” someone might say.
The point that personally worries me the most, however, is another: the creation of the High Disciplinary Court.
Instead of establishing – at a much lower cost – an internal disciplinary section within the CSM, which will theoretically be composed of magistrates separated by function and randomly selected (thus, in theory, free from factions), a new body has been created, a special judge.
Why is it worrying? The disciplinary code is the most effective tool for influencing a magistrate's activity. Mothers know this well: if you want to make a child do something, you use the tool of punishment...
And indeed, in the High Court, the weight of politics increases considerably: 15 members, of which 6 are political appointments. The decisions will not be appealable to the Supreme Court, but only before another panel of the same High Court. It is foreseen that the law will determine the ways in which the panels that will judge will be constituted…
More concretely: there are only 3 prosecutors. Since there must be at least one panel for review, and since judges and prosecutors cannot judge each other, the only possible composition for disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors is a panel with 1 prosecutor and 2 lay members (try all possible combinations, but this is the only one that meets those parameters).
In disciplinary proceedings against those who conduct investigations – even the most uncomfortable ones – the majority of the board will be political… perhaps the intention is to discourage uncomfortable investigations? If you suspect the worst… do you remember the saying?
In my opinion, this is the real crux of the reform.
I'll close with a reflection. Voting is important because, beyond slogans, it decides the type of society we want to live in.
A truly independent judiciary is not protection for magistrates, but for the weakest citizens, for those without a voice, for those who have no means to defend themselves. And it is something that, once lost, is very difficult to regain.
Thanks to whoever had the patience to read to the end.
Thank you so much for this reflection!
It seems to me that I understand that they want to separate prosecutors from judges to have fairer trials. Today, the defense attorney faces a prosecutor and a judge who potentially know each other and have worked in the same offices for X years. The judge should be impartial, but we are human beings and relationships influence us. Do you think this problem doesn't exist? If you were the defendant, wouldn't you want the judge to have the same “level of human relationship” with the prosecutor as they do with the defense attorney?
“Judges and public prosecutors cannot judge each other.” This is not written in the constitutional amendment, and today in the disciplinary section, there are both judges and public prosecutors evaluating their colleagues, correct? So why should it change afterward?
Thank you very much if you can answer us!
Of course, Elena, I'll answer. It's really important to me that people understand well before voting. Precisely because some things aren't immediately apparent, I believe certain provisions are deliberately ambiguous.
You've hit the nail on the head. The message being conveyed is: “we want to ensure an impartial judge” (implying that they aren't today) and “fairer decisions.” Obviously, phrased that way, it seems like the most reasonable choice. Then, a series of technical steps, difficult to decipher, are added, which appear as simple necessary mechanisms... and that's it: people vote "Yes" for that reason, but in reality, they are allowing political control over the judiciary to enter our system.
It's something that, at least for me, is deeply unsettling. And that's why the separation of careers is often called the “Trojan horse.”.
Precisely to avoid slogans, I'll try to explain and provide numbers (so anyone can verify them). I could give a very detailed answer to your initial question, but I'll try to be brief.
It's true: judges and public prosecutors know each other, work in the same courts, and took the same competitive exam. But this doesn't affect their decisions. It is not possible – and it's illogical even to think about it – for a judge to convict someone because the prosecutor “likes them.” Decisions are then reviewed by other judges, on appeal and at the Supreme Court, and a magistrate who decided to please a colleague would have enormous problems, even before professional ones, with their conscience.
It would be like saying a doctor always backs up a colleague's choice, or that an engineer turns a blind eye to possible structural problems because they know the colleague who built the bridge.
And the data speaks for itself: about 53% of cases end in acquittals. If judges were systematically siding with the prosecutor, these numbers simply wouldn’t exist. There’s a lot more that could be said on this topic, but I’ll stop here.
Let's get to the real point then. Even if hypothetically we accept the criticism that prosecutors and judges, knowing each other, would be too “close” (a thesis I don't agree with, but let's pretend it's true), tell me: what really changes for people with this reform?
Essentially nothing. We remain magistrates, we will continue to work in the same places. It only changes that, instead of being able to change roles once in life as today, we will never be able to. And two CSMs are created... but then prosecutors and judges are reunited in the High Disciplinary Court, which is the most sensitive body of all.
So, even if we wanted to admit those critical issues, the reform doesn't solve them. On the contrary, it concentrates enormous power precisely there—in the disciplinary body—and that is exactly where a magistrate's independence can be most impacted (as I tried to explain to you in the other message).
The whole thing appears even more suspicious when you consider that a total ban on the transfer of duties could have been introduced (as already happened with the Cartabia reform) with an ordinary law, without touching the Constitution. Instead, it is used as a “promise” to make a much deeper and less comprehensible modification more acceptable: that of the relationship between the judiciary and politics.
This is why we are trying to inform people. Not to create alarm, but because – like a doctor seeing the first signs of an illness – we see a problem coming that is not yet visible to many. And when the symptoms become obvious, it's often too late to intervene… Thank you for your interest 🙏
Thanks a lot!
I don't understand one thing, however: in what way “political control over the judiciary is introduced into our system”? Reading the law, I didn't notice this, but I'm ignorant on the subject. Where in the reform do you see this danger?
Okay Elena, I'll try to explain, hoping to be clear...
So, I don't want to be misunderstood: there is no rule in the reform that expressly states that politics will have more power over the judiciary; the point is that the risk arises from the mechanisms being introduced. First of all, I want to clarify that the independence of the judiciary does not serve magistrates as a “category,” nor does it guarantee impunity for anyone: it is a protection for everyone, especially for those without economic or political power, because a free judiciary is the only effective bulwark against the abuses of those who truly wield power. The independence of the judiciary is the real strength of those who have none: only a judge who is not afraid to rule against a powerful person can truly protect everyone's rights, especially those of the least privileged.
I don’t want to sound rhetorical, but an independent judiciary is what ensures the freedom of those who have no other protection but the law. This is why the Constitution established a self-governing body: to ensure that the judiciary is truly independent and free, decisions regarding careers, assignments, and discipline must not depend on any other branch of government, thereby guaranteeing that these choices are based on criteria of legality rather than external interests or considerations unrelated to the judicial function. That said, what does the reform entail? The CSM is being split into two bodies, and this alone reduces its overall strength, but the most critical issue is the random selection system. On the one hand, judges will be selected by lottery from a very broad pool, including very young colleagues who may lack the experience necessary to hold such a highly sensitive position involving intense political engagement. On the other hand, lay members will indeed be selected by lottery, but from a list prepared by Parliament, without any provision for a sufficiently large minimum number and, above all, without the requirement for a large majority to select those names. In practical terms, this means that the list could be drawn up solely by the governing majority, with no guarantee of pluralism. This is where the risk lies: we will have a random, heterogeneous, and potentially inexperienced judicial component, and a much more cohesive lay component, since it represents a single parliamentary majority. In any collegial body, a cohesive minority can influence a fragmented majority. It is like in a corporation: even a shareholder with a modest stake, if it is the only organized group, can influence a multitude of small, isolated shareholders. Not because it has more formal power, but because it has greater unity and a greater capacity to make an impact. Similarly, the reform does not “grant” power to politics, but creates the conditions under which that power can, in fact, increase. The problem is not political but structural: there is a risk of making the very body that is supposed to guarantee political independence more susceptible to political influence. The same pattern—indeed, an even more pronounced one—applies to the High Disciplinary Court: here the numbers are clear and verifiable: judges now make up 9 out of 15 (60%), whereas previously they accounted for two-thirds (66.7%); thus, lay members“ share rises from 33.3% to 40%; this is not a perception, but a mathematical fact, specifically within the body that will decide on disciplinary liability. Furthermore, disciplinary measures will be appealable only before the High Court itself and no longer before the Court of Cassation, making the system less subject to external oversight and more self-referential; and the new Article 105 delegates to legislation the definition of offenses and penalties, the composition of the panels, and the functioning of the High Court, ensuring only the “representativeness” of trial judges or prosecutors. On this point, here is an observation based on the numbers: there are three public prosecutors eligible for random selection; if the law is to provide for multiple panels and at least one appeals panel distinct from the one deciding at first instance, it is highly probable (a logical, not political, assessment) that there will be a total of three panels, each with a single prosecutor and a majority of politically appointed members, with the result that the prosecutor is effectively isolated within his or her own panel (I invite you to try working out the various possible combinations based on these numbers and assumptions I’ve outlined—and I doubt they can be refuted!) Putting it all together—the fragmentation of the CSM, the random selection of judges, the elimination of the three-fifths parliamentary threshold for lay members, the real increase in the political component of the High Court, internal appeals, and a panel structure that tends to isolate public prosecutors —the risk of greater political influence does not stem from proclamations, but from the structural effects of the new mechanisms: not because the reform explicitly states it, but because it creates the conditions for this to happen in practice. And that personally frightens me… A heartfelt thank you to anyone who takes the time to read this all! Happy voting to everyone.
Thank you. In the podcast with Fedez, Meloni said that the list of lay members “must necessarily be drawn up by the majority and the opposition.” I want to keep the 3/5 ratio. If I were to pass a law where the list from which members are drawn consists of only 11 members, the President of the Republic would not sign it. The list must be very long; it must be drawn up with the opposition.“ Montesquieu’s separation of powers, the foundation of any democracy, is guaranteed by Article 104, paragraph 1: The judiciary constitutes an autonomous order, independent of any other branch of government, and is composed of judges and prosecutors. Today I saw the ANM’s posters, and honestly, they worried me A LOT: ”Would you want judges who are dependent on politics?“ There is nothing in this reform that suggests judges will be controlled by politics. So making this claim amounts to making a false statement. How is it possible that those who are supposed to apply the law are distorting it in this way? It’s truly VERY concerning. You write, “The reform does not ”grant” power to politics, but it creates the conditions under which that power could, in fact, increase.“ I’m sorry, but I still can’t understand how it would do that. I do agree with you on one point, however—the random selection of judges: they could have specified the requirements for inclusion on the selection list, as they did for lay members, for example, ”with at least 15 years of experience.” High Court: 9 judges out of 15 still constitutes a strong majority (60%), even if it is no longer the 66.7% of before.
Thank you Sa.n.g. for your valuable reflections. By living this reality, you have clearly expressed its lights and shadows!
I will cast my vote in the hope that it may carry weight. Thank you 🙏
Thank you very much for the precise explanation.
Thank you to both you and Elena for the clarifications on this referendum. You have helped to clear up most of the doubts I had, and I will go vote with a bit more confidence.
I am responding to the email I received:
It's not just the simple writing modified with changed words, you need to go beyond...
The way they created this referendum, in which they didn't even seek a discussion (these are technical matters with consequences beyond the simple articles that aren't so easy to understand...)
They took on the less serious issue. Justice needs much more important laws and instead, among many words, they thought of saying:
Let's punish judges if they make mistakes!
At least the magistrates are being investigated…
But how can I trust their proposal for justice when Santachè has 3 ongoing trials, has caused companies to fail, stolen money from the state itself, and yet is still in her position...
I see the president too focused on communication strategies...
Thank you Elena for sharing this comparative work of yours, it remains a further source of reflection, which may be useful to those who decide to cast their vote.
Given the specificity and technicality of the subject, I hope at least that segment of the population that, like you, strives to address it with the greatest possible awareness will vote.